

Addressing the Relationships Among Moral Judgment Development, Authenticity, Nonprejudice, and Volunteerism

W. Pitt Derryberry, Ryan Mulvaney, Jeff Brooks, and Chris Chandler
Western Kentucky University

This study addresses how moral judgment development, authenticity, and nonprejudice account for variance in scores pertaining to various motivational functions underlying volunteerism in order to clarify certain problems associated with previous research that has considered such relationships. In the study, 127 participants completed measurements that pertain to these constructs. Correlations revealed that moral judgment had a negligible relationship with both authenticity and nonprejudice, thereby affirming that the former construct is distinct from the latter two. Linear regression analyses supported that moral judgment development and nonprejudice provided the strongest contributions to the variance of the considered indices of volunteer motivation. The motivational function underlying volunteerism was also recognized as an important factor that pertains to the observed contributions of variance. Findings are discussed in concert with and compared to prior considerations of relationships between moral judgment development and considerations of the moral self. Implications where moral education is concerned are also considered.

Keywords: moral development, authenticity, nonprejudice, volunteer motivation

INTRODUCTION

The relationship among moral judgment development and structures of self has been of interest to researchers of moral development for some time. This is because such structures seem to improve or mediate the contribution of moral judgment development on moral action. Therefore, the consideration of self is widely regarded as an important factor in enabling better understanding of moral action. Such considerations have ultimately paved the way toward the recognition that moral development is considered the product of multiple factors, and advances in multiple areas increase the likelihood of moral action and other forms of moral functioning.

Blasi (1980, 1993, 1995), for example, was instrumental in pioneering explorations of how moral judgment and structures of self come together in influencing moral action. Specifically, Blasi argued that advances in moral reasoning were not enough alone to account for moral action. He maintained that considerations of self that ultimately lead to a defined moral identity were

needed to mediate the effect of moral reasoning to moral action. Ultimately, Blasi effectively detailed how a moral identity can bridge the gap between moral reasoning and moral action or functioning.

Rest (1983) also addressed how structures of self enhance the effectiveness of moral judgment development in translating to moral action and other moral functional outcomes in what he described as the four-component model. According to Rest's four-component model, moral development is the product of at least four different components: moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral character (a.k.a., moral implementation). For Rest, each component develops independently such that development in one does not impact the development of another. At the same time, however, Rest asserted that moral action and functioning are most likely when multiple components are advanced. In delineating his moral motivation component, Rest specifically considered structures of self. According to Rest, moral motivation is the product of the internalization and prioritization of moral values that are identified as fundamental to the self. According to Rest's four-component model, then, individuals are more likely to capitalize on their moral judgments if structures of self prioritize moral values over other internalized self-values. **At the same time, since Rest's model addresses four components, it should also be pointed out that further increasing the likelihood of moral action is when the situation is identified as a moral one (i.e., moral sensitivity) and when the understanding of and commitment to a plan of action exists (i.e., moral character/implementation).**

Empirical research has found support for the theories of Blasi (1980, 1993, 1995) and Rest (1983) and their contentions regarding moral judgment development and structures of self. Recently, Derryberry and Thoma (2005) considered how moral judgment development and four different facets of self-understanding come together to increase the likelihood of three different moral actions including honesty, altruism, and taking a stand for civil liberties. An important finding from Derryberry and Thoma concerning the role of the self was that advances in both moral judgment and certain facets of self-understanding increase the likelihood of the pursuit of altruism and honesty. At the same time, Derryberry and Thoma noted that other facets of self-understanding can compensate for lapses in moral judgment where the pursuit of altruism is concerned though the same was not the case for honesty. Not only do the findings of Derryberry and Thoma confirm the importance of studying moral judgment and self structures in concert, but they also evidence that the action pursued is a central consideration.

How self structures and moral judgment development work together to influence moral functioning has also been translated to various models of moral education. For example, Narvaez (2006) incorporated Rest's (1983) four-component model in her integrative ethical education approach. Narvaez argued that one of the fundamental purposes of this approach is to foster moral expertise. In helping to develop moral expertise, the integrative ethical education approach acknowledges the importance of an ethical education that leads to ethical skills revolving around each of the various components that Rest outlined. Ultimately, Narvaez used the four-component model as a means for identifying the various ethical skills that an integrative ethical education approach should yield. Narvaez denoted that ethical skills pertaining to moral judgment that an integrative ethical education should emphasize include understanding ethical problems, using codes and identifying judgment criteria, reasoning generally, reasoning ethically, understanding consequences, reflecting on the process and outcome, and coping and resiliency. Where moral motivation is concerned, Narvaez denoted ethical skills pertaining to the self that integrative ethical education programs should emphasize include respecting others, cultivating conscience, acting

responsibly, helping others, finding meaning in life, valuing traditions and institutions, and developing ethical identity and integrity.

Approaches to moral education also exist that emphasize specific criteria that programs should ultimately produce such as community service or volunteerism. Increased attention has been given to educational initiatives that are designed to spur community service or volunteerism (Colby, Ehrlich, Beaumont, & Stephens, 2003; Mentkowski, 2000; Youniss & Yates, 1997). In conjunction with this occurrence, a variety of models have been developed that help to explain how moral judgment and structures of self can contribute to and increase the likelihood of sustained volunteerism and community service. An important example is a model that Hart, Atkins, and Donnelly (2006) recently proposed. For Hart et al., volunteerism and community service originate as a result of personality (e.g., sympathy, empathy) and social (e.g., family, culture, structure) influences. Hart et al. maintained that mediating the effect of these influences are factors that “are proposed to influence, and be influenced by, community service” (p. 637). These mediating factors include moral cognition (e.g., moral judgment, moral/civic attitudes), self (e.g., exploration, moral evaluation, salient ideals, commitment to ideals), and opportunity (e.g., via institutions and/or relationships). Therefore, the model of Hart et al. acknowledges that structures of self and moral judgment development are central features that should be addressed in programs of moral education given their ability to translate to community service and volunteerism. At the same time, however, the model of Hart et al. also denotes that an important part of such initiatives in developing both of these areas are opportunities that the moral educational program affords.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The offerings of Blasi (1980, 1993, 1995), Rest (1983), Derryberry and Thoma (2005), Narvaez (2006), and Hart et al. (2006) all conclude and agree that understanding moral functioning requires consideration of the relationship among moral judgment development and structures of self. On one hand in considering this relationship, it is clear what these authors mean by the term “moral judgment development” and how it is indexed. The construct of moral judgment development and its measurement has a long history (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932) that still thrives today (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999; Thoma, 2006). On the other hand, however, these authors are not as precise in providing understanding about self. For example, although Blasi (1980, 1993, 1995) articulated the role of moral identity and denoted for developmental modes that a moral identity can follow, he did not identify what those self structures are that specifically contribute to a moral identity. As he stated, this “has not been approached in any systematic manner. It seems clear, though, that only some people tend to shape their identity around moral values and that this difference does not exclusively depend on age, education, or identity mode” (Blasi, 1995, p. 244). A similar predicament is found in Rest’s four-component model. Although Rest noted that moral motivation is the product of the internalization and prioritization of moral values that are identified as fundamental to the self, Rest did not denote those aspects of or contributors to self that may set the stage for such an occurrence. Derryberry and Thoma are detailed in describing the four facets of self-understanding their study addressed. However, indexing these constructs is cumbersome, is complex, and lacks statistical parsimony. Furthermore, how the four self-understanding constructs they address relate to the intended self constructs of Blasi (1980, 1993, 1995) and Rest is uncertain. Where the moral educational models of Narvaez and Hart et al. are con-

cerned, it is unclear what structural changes in self are occurring as a result of the programs they are endorsing.

Another problem has occurred in how models such as the one developed by Hart et al. (2006) conceptualize the role of moral judgment development and its contribution to volunteerism. Specifically, such models address advanced moral judgment as linked to volunteerism. As Hart et al. noted, "the available research suggests that those with sophisticated moral judgment are more likely to volunteer than are those whose moral reasoning is relatively immature" (p. 642). Hence, advanced levels are emphasized and lower levels are de-emphasized. However, current paradigms of moral judgment development take a more holistic approach. For example, the neo-Kohlbergian approach acknowledges the existence of three different moral judgment developmental schemata: the *personal interest schema* (i.e., where moral judgments are based on personal and self-serving interests and associations), the *maintaining norms schema* (i.e., where moral judgments revolve around the conventions, rules, or standards of the social system), and the *postconventional schema* (i.e., where a social contract and/or a prior-to-society viewpoint is employed resulting in moral judgments being based on universal principles of justice and fairness; see Rest et al., 1999). The neo-Kohlbergian approach supports a developmental pattern in which a particular moral judgment schema is modal and is emphasized over the other two when moral decisions are required (Rest et al., 1999). Moral judgment development therefore originates with the personal interest schema as the modal moral judgment schema and peaks once the postconventional moral judgment schema becomes modal. At the same time, each schema can be referenced at any point in making a moral decision regardless of the modal moral judgment schema. As the neo-Kohlbergian approach endorses, then, it is important to look at the individual's reference to each moral judgment schema when assessing moral judgment development overall. This is because solely focusing on an individual's reference of the postconventional schema in making moral decisions could result in misperceptions about that person's moral judgment development overall. For example, two individuals could place similar emphasis on the postconventional schema in making moral decisions though both could be developmentally distinct. Such a predicament would occur if one individual's modal moral judgment schema was the maintaining norms schema and the other participant's modal moral judgment schema was the personal interest schema. Hence, to fully ascertain how moral judgment development relates to both structures of self and relevant outcomes such as volunteerism, it is important that moral educational models consider a variety of indices that assess differing aspects of moral judgment development.

The research of Derryberry and Thoma (2005) as well as that of Clary et al. (1998) brings up a final problem with previous research pertaining to the relationship among moral judgment development and structures of self and their concert contributions to moral functioning. As Derryberry and Thoma found, moral judgment development and self-understanding increased the likelihood of honesty and altruism but not taking a stand for civil liberties. In addition, Derryberry and Thoma noted that certain facets of self-understanding compensate for deficits in moral judgment in the pursuit of both altruism and taking a stand for civil liberties but not honesty. Thus, Derryberry and Thoma supported that equally important in this consideration is the type of moral action that is pursued. The findings of Clary et al. are also relevant here. In exploring volunteering, Clary et al. found support for seven differing motivational functions that can underlie the pursuit of this action. Some of these functions are more internally driven such as a desire to volunteer because of specific values held or because of a desire to gain understanding about others and the world around them. Other functions that Clary et al. described are more externally oriented such

as a desire to impress or gain the approval of others. Other functions are both internally and externally driven such as the desire to learn about career options in conjunction with the desire to be in a position to gain career opportunities. Clary et al. offered, then, that those who explore volunteering outcomes need to be considerate of and account for the reasons underlying this action. Certainly, this is a consideration for those that consider the contributions of moral judgment development and structures of self. To be sure, in studying contributions from moral judgment development and structures of self to volunteering, it seems that differing contributions could exist if the motivational functions underlying volunteer efforts were denoted.

PURPOSE OF THE CURRENT STUDY

The purpose of the current study is to further account for the relationship among moral judgment development and structures of self and their contributions to volunteering. In doing so, this study has three overall goals as a result of the aforementioned cited problems in previous offerings: (a) to account for structures of self not previously studied in concert with moral judgment development that may pertain to the capacities of self that the aforementioned authors addressed, (b) to index moral judgment development at the three developmental schema that the neo-Kohlbergian approach identified so that consideration of this construct is more specific, and (c) to denote the type of action by addressing some of the internal and external motivational functions underlying volunteerism that Clary et al. (1998) identified.

As noted, a goal of this study is to account for structures of self that have not been considered previously. Before identifying the research questions of this study, it is important to document these structures and to explain how each may pertain to previous considerations of self. Two relatively new structures of self are considered. The first is authenticity, which Goldman and Kernis (2004) defined as “the unimpeded operation of one’s true, or core self in one’s daily enterprise” (p. 1). Goldman and Kernis maintained that authenticity is comprised by four subcomponents: (a) *awareness* (e.g., “Awareness of, and trust in, one’s motives, feelings, desires, and self-relevant cognitions” [p. 1]), (b) *unbiased processing* (e.g., “Not denying, distorting, exaggerating, nor ignoring private knowledge, internal experiences, and externally based self-evaluative information” [p. 1]), (c) *behavior action* (e.g., “Acting in accord with one’s values, preferences, and needs” [p. 1]), and (d) *relational orientation* (e.g., “Valuing and achieving openness and truthfulness in one’s close relationships” [p. 1]).

Nonprejudice (Phillips & Ziller, 1997) is the second construct of self explored in this study. According to Phillips and Ziller, nonprejudice is “a universal orientation in interpersonal relations whereby the actor selectively attends to and accentuates the similarities between the self and diverse others” (p. 420). As such, nonprejudice should not be considered as simply the opposite of prejudice. Instead, it refers to an orientation that an individual maintains in consideration of all individuals.

Authenticity and nonprejudice appear to pertain to the way in which Blasi (1980, 1993, 1995), Rest (1983), Narvaez (2006), and Hart et al. (2006) have conceptualized self in a variety of ways. Where the theories of Blasi and Rest are concerned, authenticity and nonprejudice should not be presumed synonymous with what Blasi intended in defining moral identity and what Rest meant in delineating moral motivation. However, both of these constructs refer to some important aspects that both of these authors reference. Where Rest’s concept of moral motivation is concerned, the functions of the awareness, behavior action, and relational orientation subcomponents of au-

thenticity could be instrumental processes leading to the internalization and prioritization of moral values relative to other ones (or any other values for that matter).

Authenticity appears to be similar in many ways to one of four modes of moral identity that Blasi (1993) denoted. For Blasi (1993), the moral identity goes through four developmental modes. Blasi (1993) described the most developmentally advanced mode as identity as authenticity. Not only is this mode similar in name to the authenticity construct of Goldman and Kernis (2004), Blasi's (1993) description also describes similar elements. As Blasi (1993) stated, dominant characteristics comprising this mode include "the discovery of inner conflicts and dichotomies; the affirmation of one's autonomy, particularly with respect to cultural and social stereotypes; one's relation to universal humanity and worldwide concerns; openness to truth and objectivity in determining one's life and identity" (p. 105). In breaking down the four characteristics noted in the previous quotation, three of the subcomponents that Goldman and Kernis referenced in articulating their construct are foreshadowed. These include unbiased processing (alluded to at the beginning and end of the quote), awareness (the second noted characteristic in the quote), and relational orientation (the third noted characteristic in the quote). It also seems that the behavior action subcomponent the authenticity construct of Goldman and Kernis is presaged in Blasi's (1993) consideration of the behavioral implications of the identity as authenticity mode. As Blasi (1993, 1995) maintained, action—whether moral or nonmoral—is a natural and automatic extension of this mode that requires little if any reflection or deliberation on the part of the individual.

Because moral reasoning and judgment refer to the consideration and identification of implicit social guidelines about how humans should co-operate in societal situations, it is plausible that those high in nonprejudice—who emphasize the similarity among humans rather than the differences—would be more inclined to follow through on their moral judgments. Indeed, research of constructs similar to nonprejudice has shown this to be the case (see Colby & Damon, 1992; Monroe & Epperson, 1994). As such, the pertinence of nonprejudice to both moral identity and moral motivation is discernible.

It also appears that strengths in authenticity and nonprejudice could lead to some of the outcomes of self that Narvaez (2006) and Hart et al. (2006) addressed. Given how both of these constructs are central in describing how the self is ultimately defined, it may be that advances in both might set the stage for generating most if not all of the self outcomes that Narvaez and Hart et al. identified as fundamental to moral education.

Given the issues acknowledged with previous considerations, the current study seeks to answer to the following research questions:

1. What is the nature of the relationships among moral judgment development, authenticity, and nonprejudice?
2. Do moral judgment development, authenticity, and nonprejudice account for variance in indices that pertain to volunteerism?

METHOD

Participants

Participants for this study included 124 students from a large southeastern university. Of these considered participants, 38 were freshman, 49 were sophomores, 21 were juniors, and 13 were se-

niors. The ages ranged from 17 to 42 with a mean of 20.61. In terms of gender, there were 53 males and 71 females. Among those that provided information about ethnicity, 102 were Caucasian, 12 were African American, 1 was Hispanic, and 5 designated other.

Materials

Demographics questionnaire. Demographics information noted in this questionnaire included age, sex, ethnicity, college year classification, and major.

Authenticity Inventory 3. The Authenticity Inventory 3 (AI3; Kernis & Goldman, 2005) was used to assess authenticity. In addition to producing a composite score, this 45-item Likert-type scale indices four subcomponents of authenticity including awareness, unbiased processing, behavior, and relational orientation. Scores on the composite authenticity score range from 45 to 225 with higher scores indicative of greater authenticity. Scores on the awareness index range from 12 to 60, scores on the unbiased processing index range from 10 to 50, scores on the behavior index range from 11 to 55, and scores on the relational orientation scale range from 12 to 60. Higher scores on each index are indicative of higher amounts of each aspect of authenticity. Only the indices of the four subcomponents are considered in the current study. Internal consistency is acceptable for each index in the current study where $\alpha = .78$ for awareness, $\alpha = .72$ for unbiased processing, $\alpha = .60$ for behavior, and $\alpha = .69$ for relational orientation.

Universal Orientation Scale. The Universal Orientation Scale (UOS; Phillips & Ziller, 1997) was used as a measure of nonprejudice. The UOS is a 20-item scale in which responses are made using a 5-point likert scale. Each item measures one's universal orientation, or the perception of self–other similarities. The UOS scores range from 20 to 100, with higher scores indicating nonprejudice. Internal consistency for UOS scores in the current study is acceptable with reported Cronbach's alpha of .65.

Defining Issues Test–2. The Defining Issues Test–2 (DIT–2; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999) was used to assess moral judgment. The DIT–2 is a popular objective assessment that assesses moral reasoning and resultant judgments regarding five moral dilemmas in which a protagonist must make a decision. In taking the DIT–2, participants are asked to make an action choice about what the protagonist should do and then are asked to rate and rank 12 items in terms of their overall importance in making the action choice. A participant's ratings and rankings of all considered items across the five dilemmas provide information about the relative importance of the personal interest, maintaining norms, and postconventional moral judgment schema.

From the data that DIT–2 responses supply, a variety of developmental indices are generated. An important DIT–2 index utilized in the present study is the Postconventional (or P) score, which refers to participants' reference of the postconventional schema. This index ranges from 0 to 95, with higher scores indicative of a perceived greater overall importance of items pertaining to the postconventional schema. Although a newer index of reference of the postconventional schema exists known as the N2 score, it is important to note that research supports that the N2 is most effective in identifying those reasoning at the most advanced levels (Thoma, 2006). It is therefore advantageous to use the newer N2 score in samples such as graduate and professional schools where such advances could reasonably be expected (Thoma, 2006). As Thoma noted, "Current observations of high school and college samples suggest that P scores and N2 scores tend to behave

very similarly” (p. 80). Other developmental indices referenced in the current study include the Maintaining Norms (or MN) and Personal Interest (or PI) scores, which denote an individual’s ranked importance of items pertaining to the maintaining norms and personal interest schemata. Like the P scores, scores on these indices range from 0 to 95, with higher scores indicative of greater perceived importance of the respective moral judgment schema. In evaluating the internal consistency of the DIT–2 in the current study, Cronbach’s alphas were computed at the item-level for each schema (e.g., consideration of the consistency across DIT rating items specific to particular moral judgment schema), as Crowson, DeBacker, Thoma, and Derryberry (2006) recently recommended. Internal consistency is acceptable where $\alpha = .81$ for the postconventional schema, $\alpha = .69$ for the maintaining norms schema, and $\alpha = .77$ for the personal interest schema.

Volunteer Functions Inventory. The Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI; Clary et al., 1998) measures the motives underlying an individual’s volunteer efforts. The VFI is a 48-question assessment that indices specific functions of volunteer motivations including values, understanding, social, career, protective, enhancement, and satisfaction motivational functions. On the VFI, participants are asked to indicate how important or accurate that ensuing reasons for and outcomes from volunteering are. Scores for each function range from 7 to 49 with the higher score indicating the greater the importance of the motivational function.

In the current study, four different VFI motivational function indices are addressed including values, understanding, social, and career. Scores on the values and understanding indices appear to be the result of internally driven or intrinsically motivated volunteerism. Individuals with high values scores pursue opportunities to volunteer because of held and prioritized values they wish to serve. Those with high understanding scores volunteer because they wish to better gain better understanding of society, people in general, or the cause they are serving. Scores on the social index seem to represent externally driven reasons for volunteering. Those with high social scores volunteer in order to meet the expectations of or gain approval from others. Scores on the career index appear to involve both internal and external reasons for volunteering. Those with high career scores see volunteering as a means to learn more about a possible career endeavor (i.e., internal) and/or as a way to gain experience that could yield future career opportunities (i.e., external). Internal consistency for each index is good in the current study with reported Cronbach’s alpha for each index as follows: $VFI_{val} = .84$, $VFI_{und} = .89$, $VFI_{car} = .84$, and $VFI_{soc} = .86$.

Procedure

All data were collected in sessions ranging from 45 minutes to 1 hour. Participants were obtained from various classes from the College of Education at a regional public comprehensive university in the Southeast. Informed consent was obtained at the start of the session and participant numbers were assigned. Participants completed then completed the four questionnaires. Participants completed the questionnaires in the same order. All participants were given extra credit for their full participation. Three participants did not complete the full battery of questionnaires.

RESULTS

In terms of authenticity, sample means were highest on the awareness ($M = 43.28$, $SD = 6.20$) and relational orientation ($M = 44.36$, $SD = 5.57$) scales and lowest on the behavior ($M = 36.10$, $SD =$

5.10) and unbiased processing ($M = 29.88$, $SD = 6.13$) scales. This therefore supports that in the current sample overall authenticity is more influenced by awareness and relational orientation than it is on unbiased processing and behavior. At the same time, it should be noted that the means and standard deviations of each index supports that the sample is not overly high on this construct and would be considered average in terms of authenticity overall. In other words, most in the sample were not fully aware of or had yet to identify their true or core self, the ultimate function of authenticity. In terms of nonprejudice, UOS scores ($M = 68.72$, $SD = 7.63$) indicate that the sample was neither high nor low in terms of this construct. Where moral judgment development is concerned, postconventional ($M = 27.15$, $SD = 14.90$), maintaining norms ($M = 32.50$, $SD = 11.26$), and personal interest ($M = 32.13$, $SD = 13.27$) scores indicate that there was a preference for DIT-2 items pertaining to the maintaining norms and personal interest schema. For volunteer motivation, VFI values ($M = 39.94$, $SD = 6.93$), understanding ($M = 40.20$, $SD = 6.38$), career ($M = 39.05$, $SD = 6.77$), and social ($M = 33.15$, $SD = 8.39$) scores indicate that the sample tended to volunteer as a result of values, understanding, and career motivational functions rather than social functions.

Table 1 addresses correlations among the considered indices. Few significant relationships existed between indices of differing measurements. Most of these relationships were with the VFI indices and were not among the predictor variables. It is interesting to note that negligible relationships exist among UOS scores and three of the four AI3 indices, though a significant correlation is seen between UOS and AI3 relational orientation scores. As such, it is apparent that the UOS and AI3 measure different aspects of self.

Four linear regressions were conducted with the considered VFI indices serving as the dependent variable in each. Each consisted of three blocks with DIT-2 postconventional, maintaining norms, and personal interest scores comprising the first block; AI3 awareness, unbiased

TABLE 1
Correlations Among DIT, AI3, UOS, and VFI Scores

	<i>P</i>	<i>MN</i>	<i>PI</i>	<i>AIaw</i>	<i>AIup</i>	<i>AIb</i>	<i>AIro</i>	<i>UOS</i>	<i>VFIval</i>	<i>VFIund</i>	<i>VFIcar</i>	<i>VFIso</i>
<i>P</i>	1.00											
<i>MN</i>	-.36**	1.00										
<i>PI</i>	-.50**	-.47*	1.00									
<i>AIaw</i>	-.01	-.16	.17	1.00								
<i>AIup</i>	-.03	-.20*	.15	.35**	1.00							
<i>AIb</i>	-.032	-.11	.17	.43**	.39**	1.00						
<i>AIro</i>	.12	-.03	-.03	.43**	.31**	.51**	1.00					
<i>UOS</i>	.10	-.002	-.04	.11	.02	.18	.31**	1.00				
<i>VFIval</i>	.08	.22*	-.13	.07	-.08	-.02	.13	.35**	1.00			
<i>VFIund</i>	-.01	.24**	-.10	.16	-.06	-.06	.15	.36**	.81**	1.00		
<i>VFIcar</i>	.08	.15	-.08	-.07	-.15	-.21*	-.10	.24**	.51**	.60**	1.00	
<i>VFIso</i>	-.07	.37**	-.17	-.002	-.23**	-.16	-.03	.16	.56**	.63**	.51**	1.00

Note. DIT = Defining Issues Test; AI3 = Authenticity Inventory-3; UOS = Universal Orientation Scale; VFI = Volunteer Functions Inventory; *P* = DIT-2 Postconventional score; *MN* = DIT-2 Maintaining Norms score; *PI* = DIT-2 Personal Interest score; *AIaw* = AI3 awareness score; *AIup* = AI3 unbiased processing score; *AIb* = AI3 behavior score; *AIro* = AI3 relational orientation score; *VFIval* = VFI values score; *VFIund* = VFI understanding score; *VFIcar* = VFI career score; *VFIso* = VFI social score.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

processing, behavior, and relational orientation scores comprising the second block; and UOS scores comprising the third block. As Tables 2 and 3 illustrate, the DIT-2 and UOS blocks significantly contributed to the variance of VFI values and career scores. As Table 4 shows, all three blocks provided significant contributions to VFI understanding score variance. As noted in Table 5, only the DIT-2 block provided a significant contribution to the variance of VFI social scores.

DISCUSSION

The current study was initiated in order to better understand how moral judgment development, authenticity, and universal orientation pertain to various motivational functions underlying volunteerism. As a result of the findings and contentions of authors such as Blasi (1980, 1993, 1995), Rest (1983), Derryberry and Thoma (2005), Narvaez (2006), and Hart et al. (2006), a variety of issues that pertain to these constructs were considered. Overall, some interesting findings were yielded pertaining to various relationships among these constructs. Since both research questions referred to differing aspects of these relationships, findings as they pertain to each research question are examined individually below.

TABLE 2
Summary of Linear Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting VFI Values Index

		<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β	<i>T</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Block 1 ^a	P	.23	.07	.50	3.12	.002
	MN	.37	.10	.60	3.81	.000
	PI	.21	.09	.41	2.39	.02
Block 2 ^b	P	.22	.08	.47	2.86	.005
	MN	.36	.10	.58	3.60	.000
	PI	.21	.09	.39	2.28	.03
	AIaw	.12	.12	.11	1.01	.31
	AIup	-.05	.11	-.05	-.47	.64
	AIb	-.14	.15	-.10	-.91	.37
	AIro	.15	.14	.12	1.10	.27
Block 3 ^c	P	.20	.07	.42	2.73	.007
	MN	.31	.09	.55	3.61	.000
	PI	.19	.09	.37	2.23	.03
	AIaw	.12	.11	.11	1.12	.26
	AIup	-.02	.11	-.02	-.22	.83
	AIb	-.16	.14	-.12	-1.13	.56
	AIro	.03	.13	.02	.19	.85
UOS	.29	.08	.32	3.70	.000	

Note. Total $R^2 = .24$. VFI = Volunteer Functions Inventory; P = Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2) Postconventional score; MN = DIT-2 Maintaining Norms score; PI = DIT-2 Personal Interest score; AIaw = Authenticity Inventory-3 (AI3) awareness score; AIup = AI3 unbiased processing score; AIb = AI3 behavior score; AIro = AI3 relational orientation score.

^a $R^2 = .13, p < .001$. ^b $R^2 = .02, p < .55$. ^c $R^2 = .09, p < .000$.

TABLE 3
Summary of Linear Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting VFI Career Index

		<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β	<i>T</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Block 1 ^a	P	.21	.07	.46	2.78	.006
	MN	.30	.10	.50	3.11	.002
	PI	.20	.09	.39	2.22	.03
Block 2 ^b	P	.22	.08	.49	2.93	.004
	MN	.31	.10	.52	3.17	.002
	PI	.22	.09	.44	2.50	.01
	AIaw	.07	.11	.06	.58	.57
	AIup	-.02	.11	-.02	-.19	.85
	AIb	-.28	.15	-.21	-1.59	.06
	AIro	-.05	.13	-.04	-.39	.70
Block 3 ^c	P	.20	.07	.45	2.80	.006
	MN	.30	.10	.49	3.14	.002
	PI	.21	.09	.41	2.44	.02
	AIaw	.07	.11	.07	.65	.52
	AIup	.004	.11	.004	.04	.97
	AIb	-.30	.14	-.23	-2.11	.04
	AIro	-.16	.13	-.13	-1.19	.24
	UOS	.25	.08	.29	3.17	.002

Note. Total $R^2 = .21$. VFI = Volunteer Functions Inventory; P = Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2) Postconventional score; MN = DIT-2 Maintaining Norms score; PI = DIT-2 Personal Interest score; AIaw = Authenticity Inventory-3 (AI3) awareness score; AIup = AI3 unbiased processing score; AIb = AI3 behavior score; AIro = AI3 relational orientation score.

What Is the Nature of the Relationships Among Moral Judgment Development, Authenticity, and Nonprejudice?

As the correlation matrix of Table 1 shows, the DIT-2 moral judgment developmental indices are negligibly related to the AI3 and UOS indices. Overall, then, it is apparent that the construct measured by DIT-2 scores is unique from the constructs that the AI3 and UOS measure. These relationships are sensible if one considers acknowledgements that Blasi (1980, 1993, 1995) and Rest (1983) made. For example, Blasi initiated discussion on moral identity as a means for explaining disparity in moral action among individuals that are similar in moral judgment development. For Blasi, the absence of a developed moral identity is a chief reason why moral reasoning and judgment would fail to translate to moral action for some. Its presence would explain why moral reasoning and judgment bolsters the pursuit of action for others. Rest was staunch in his maintenance that his four-component model did not follow a temporal order. In other words, each of the four components develops independently, and advances in one do not increase the likelihood of advances in another. Certainly, the findings of the current study are in accordance with these assertions from Blasi and Rest. Hence, there is reason to believe that authenticity and nonprejudice may pertain to the self structures that both of these authors addressed.

In addition to the arguments of Blasi (1980) and Rest (1983), there is another reason that can explain why the DIT-2 indices had a minimal relationship with the AI3 and UOS indices. Moral judgment development, as defined by the DIT-2, is considered a developmental psychological

TABLE 4
Summary of Linear Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting VFI Understanding Index

		<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Block 1 ^a	P	.12	.07	.28	1.74	.09
	MN	.26	.09	.47	2.90	.005
	PI	.13	.08	.27	1.53	.13
Block 2 ^b	P	.11	.07	.25	1.55	.12
	MN	.26	.09	.46	2.86	.005
	PI	.12	.08	.26	1.49	.14
	AIaw	.24	.11	.23	2.24	.03
	AIup	-.05	.10	-.05	-.50	.62
	AIb	-.26	.14	-.21	-1.89	.06
	AIro	.19	.12	.16	1.51	.13
Block 3 ^c	P	.09	.07	.21	1.33	.19
	MN	.24	.09	.43	2.85	.005
	PI	.11	.08	.23	1.40	.17
	AIaw	.24	.10	.24	2.45	.02
	AIup	-.02	.10	-.02	-.23	.82
	AIb	-.28	.13	-.23	-2.20	.03
	AIro	.07	.12	.06	.54	.59
	UOS	.29	.07	.35	4.02	.000

Note. Total $R^2 = .27$. VFI = Volunteer Functions Inventory; P = Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2) Postconventional score; MN = DIT-2 Maintaining Norms score; PI = DIT-2 Personal Interest score; AIaw = Authenticity Inventory-3 (AI3) awareness score; AIup = AI3 unbiased processing score; AIb = AI3 behavior score; AIro = AI3 relational orientation score.

^a $R^2 = .08, p < .02$. ^b $\Delta R^2 = .08, p < .04$. ^c $\Delta R^2 = .11, p < .000$.

construct, whereas authenticity and nonprejudice are considered social psychological constructs. Thus, there is not much of a basis for the DIT-2 indices to have a strong or even moderate relationship with either the AI3 or UOS indices. The magnitude of the observed relationships therefore supports that designating the moral judgment developmental construct of the DIT-2 into a psychological domain that is different from that which houses the constructs of the AI3 and UOS is warranted. Furthermore, since there is no evidence that advances in one area are associated with advances in the other, it is apparent from this study that moral educational models such as those of Narvaez (2006) and Hart et al. (2006) are justified in their "separate but equal" treatment and attention to educational aspects and initiatives designed to spur and develop skills in both moral cognition and moral self.

The relationships among the AI3 and UOS indices are worth noting. As Table 1 illustrates, UOS scores minimally related to AI3 awareness, unbiased processing, and behavior scores. However, a significant relationship was observed between UOS and relational orientation scores. Together these findings support that the AI3 and UOS measure different constructs of self though they do share some variance that pertains to how the self is connected with and relates to others. Therefore, this study supports that relying on both the AI3 and UOS to reflect self results in little redundancy. In addition, using both instruments can result in a richer portrayal of the self, which is of particular value for studies such as this where addressing the nature of the self is of fundamental importance.

TABLE 5
Summary of Linear Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting VFI Social Index

		<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Block 1 ^a	P	.08	.09	.13	.83	.41
	MN	.32	.12	.43	2.75	.007
	PI	.07	.11	.11	.62	.54
Block 2 ^b	P	.06	.09	.11	.66	.51
	MN	.30	.12	.40	2.51	.01
	PI	.07	.11	.10	.60	.55
	AIaw	.21	.14	.16	1.54	.13
	AIup	-.24	.13	-.17	-1.77	.08
	AIb	-.25	.18	-.15	-1.40	.16
Block 3 ^c	AIro	.05	.16	.04	.33	.74
	P	.05	.09	.08	.51	.61
	MN	.29	.12	.38	2.44	.02
	PI	.06	.11	.09	.52	.61
	AIaw	.22	.14	.16	1.59	.12
	AIup	-.22	.13	-.16	-1.64	.10
	AIb	-.27	.18	-.16	-1.51	.14
	AIro	-.03	.16	-.02	-.158	.88
UOS	.19	.10	.17	1.92	.06	

Note. Total $R^2 = .20$. VFI = Volunteer Functions Inventory; P = Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2) Postconventional score; MN = DIT-2 Maintaining Norms score; PI = DIT-2 Personal Interest score; AIaw = Authenticity Inventory-3 (AI3) awareness score; AIup = AI3 unbiased processing score; AIb = AI3 behavior score; AIro = AI3 relational orientation score.

^a $R^2 = .12, p < .002$. ^b $\Delta R^2 = .05, p < .13$. ^c $\Delta R^2 = .03, p < .06$.

Do Moral Judgment Development, Authenticity, and Nonprejudice Account for Variance in Indices That Pertain to Volunteerism?

A significant portion of variance was accounted for on each of the four indices of volunteerism that were addressed in this study. However, there were differing contributions in each regression analysis. For example, the moral judgment block accounted for a significant portion of the variance in all four VFI indices, though not all of the DIT-2 indices were significant predictors in each analysis once all predictor variables were included in the analyses. As Tables 2 to 5 denote, significant contributions to VFI values and career scores were seen from DIT-2 postconventional, maintaining norms, and personal interest scores. Significant contributions to VFI understanding and social scores were seen from DIT-2 maintaining norms scores. Given these contributions, it appears that each of the three moral judgment schema that the DIT-2 measures can lead to understanding that pertains to a variety of motivational functions underlying volunteerism including those that are internally driven (i.e., VFI values and understanding), partially internally driven (i.e., VFI career), and externally driven (i.e., VFI social).

These findings regarding the contributions of the DIT-2 indices affirm the importance of addressing multiple moral judgment developmental indices when accounting for volunteerism. This is especially true in samples such as the current one where moral judgment development is not particularly advanced, and a particular schema is therefore not strongly emphasized over others. Considering multiple moral judgment developmental indices also enables other trends to be ob-

served that might not have been expected. An example of this in the current study is the finding that DIT-2 maintaining norms scores were the only significant predictor of the VFI understanding index. Why maintaining norms scores would significantly contribute to this index and post-conventional and personal interest scores would not is uncertain and addressing this relationship is certainly worthy of further study in the future. One possibility for explaining this contribution is that those operating from the maintaining norms schema have a duty orientation that is directed towards the social system (Rest et al., 1999). As a result of this, perhaps this duty orientation compels individuals to strive to do things such as that which VFI understanding scores represent (i.e., gain better understanding of society, people in general, or the cause they are serving).

The authenticity block only accounted for a significant portion of variance on the VFI understanding index (see Table 4). It may be tempting, then, to minimize the relevance of the authenticity construct where volunteerism concerned. However, it is important to note that the means of each AI3 index were neither high nor low and consistently fell in the middle of the range of scores for each index. Also, standard deviations support that there was not much variability from the mean. Given these conditions, it is hard to reach conclusions about the relevance of the authenticity construct to volunteerism. In addition, it is hard to affirm or deny whether this construct is similar to the identity as authenticity mode of Blasi (1993, 1995). At the same time, though, the contribution of AI3 scores—particularly awareness and behavior—to the VFIund index provides some support that authenticity is of relevance to volunteerism and that stronger relationships with other VFI constructs might be seen in samples where there are higher AI3 means and/or greater variability. As Table 4 shows, the contributions of the AI3 indices as a whole are similar to the contributions of the other two blocks in this analysis given the amount of variance they shared with the criterion. This may suggest that those who are beginning or primed to advance in terms of authenticity may be motivated toward volunteerism as a result of a desire to gain understanding of social groups, people in general, and causes. Any acquired understanding then would ultimately serve to facilitate authenticity. Hence, the relationship between authenticity and volunteerism may ultimately be a reciprocal one. Certainly, further research is needed both to confirm this latter possibility and to better understand how authenticity relates to volunteerism in general.

Evidence was provided supporting that nonprejudice is an important reason why volunteerism may be pursued. As Tables 2 to 5 note, UOS scores provided a significant contribution to the variance of three of the four VFI indexes, the social index being the one exception. Indeed, these contributions are sensible and should be expected. As noted, nonprejudice refers to an orientation in which similarities between self and diverse others are emphasized in interpersonal relations (Phillips & Ziller, 1997). Given this definition, then, it could be argued using the definitions of VFI values, understanding, and career functions as lenses or vantage points that those high in nonprejudice have deep rooted and emphasized values pertaining to their connection with others, have a fundamental desire to understand and extend the connection they have with others, and wish to understand make themselves available to those areas in which they can most effectively foster this connection. Certainly, the findings of the current study where the contributions of UOS scores are concerned give reason to believe that this presumption is warranted. Therefore, those who are high in nonprejudice may be more susceptible to the pursuit of volunteerism given their perceived connection to others. To be sure, there is support in research of other types of moral actions that have addressed constructs similar to nonprejudice that suggests that connection to others is an important contributor. In studying those who went to great lengths in standing up for the rights of others, for example, both Monroe and Epperson (1994) and Colby and Damon (1992) noted that a key as-

pect that distinguished these individuals was their tendency to view humanity as alike rather than distinct.

The amount of accounted variance in each regression analysis sheds light on how moral judgment development, authenticity, and nonprejudice account for volunteerism. Specifically, the difference in R^2 in certain analyses suggests that the motivational function underlying volunteerism is of importance when examining contributions from variables such as those considered in the current study. As seen in Tables 2 to 5, less variance was accounted for on VFI career and social than on VFI values and understanding. As noted earlier, the VFI values and understanding indices pertain to motivational functions that are internally driven, the VFI social index pertains to externally driven motivational functions, and the VFI career index appears to pertain to both. Since there were both differences in R^2 as well as differences in how each block of indices accounted for the shared variance, this study supports the contentions of Derryberry and Thoma (2005), who noted the type of moral action that is pursued is a relevant concern when accounting for the contribution of multiple moral developmental factors. The findings of the current study also support that those moral educational models such as that of Hart et al. (2006), which focus on the promotion of desired criteria like volunteerism would be wise to address the type or types of volunteerism that the model is intended to yield.

CONCLUSION

This study supports that moral judgment development is distinguishable from constructs of self such as authenticity and nonprejudice. Furthermore, this study supports that each construct is beneficial in accounting for variance in a variety of motivational functions underlying volunteerism and that such motivational functions are of fundamental concern when accounting for such contributions. Given the various contributions of these three constructs, support is provided that the likelihood of moral action or ethical behavior is increased in the presence of multiple constructs relevant to moral development as has been suggested in prior discussions (i.e., Blasi, 1980, 1993, 1995; Rest, 1983). These findings are also supportive of those who have proposed moral educational models that have outlined the involvement and facilitation of multiple areas (i.e., Narvaez, 2006; Hart et al., 2006).

Important insights are also generated through the current study if one assesses the contributions of each considered predictor variable in isolation. Where moral judgment development is concerned, this study supports that motivation to volunteer is not just the product of advanced moral judgment schema and that earlier schemata (e.g., the personal interest and maintaining norms) offer lines of reasoning that can prompt certain motivational functions underlying volunteering. Therefore, the findings of this study suggest that those responsible for moral educational programs would be prudent in adopting a more holistic approach in evaluating how its various efforts and curricula translate to moral judgment development.

This study sheds light on the importance of authenticity and nonprejudice—two relatively new social psychological constructs—to the motivation to pursue volunteer opportunities. Where these last two constructs are concerned, it seems that nonprejudice may be of particular relevance to the constructs that authors such as Blasi (1980, 1993, 1995) and Rest (1983) identified since it contributed to a significant portion of shared variance for three of the four considered indices of volunteer motivation. Therefore, a chief aspect that may be fundamental to both Blasi's construct

of moral identity and Rest's construct of moral motivation is how individuals perceive themselves relative to others. When a strong connection with others in conjunction with perceived similarities occur (hence resulting in greater nonprejudice), the likelihood of a moral identity may be increased and moral motivation may be accentuated. Indeed, additional research is needed to consider this further. Although the contributions of authenticity were less consistent than was the case for nonprejudice, its contribution to VFIund scores should not be overlooked and additional study addressing its relationship to moral functioning is recommended. As a result of these findings, it seems that those responsible for programs of moral education would be justified in monitoring how their programs pertain to both of these constructs.

To be sure, there are some limitations associated with the current study. One of the problems of this study is that it only includes college students, the large majority of whom had yet to reach their junior year. As such, there were lower scores and not much variability on certain indices including the DIT and AI3. Although this was not as much a problem for assessing the contribution of DIT scores, it may have been a reason why few contributions from the AI3 indices were seen. Thus, future studies of these relationships would be wise to include those from adult populations where more advanced scores in these constructs and greater variability overall might be seen.

Another limitation of this study is that the assessment of volunteerism did not occur during or immediately after a specific instance of volunteering, and participants were not necessarily referring to the same cause or causes as they were completing the VFI. To be sure, VFI scores can be used to better understand why people are motivated to serve a specific cause. However, the current study used the VFI as a way of understanding why participants are motivated to volunteer (or would be motivated to volunteer) in general since there was not a common cause that all participants were serving. As such, future considerations of these relationships would be prudent to do so in a group where all are involved in service to the same cause such as Habitat for Humanity, a blood drive, or other causes that people of a variety of ages and backgrounds are motivated to serve. The additional advantage of this is that doing so might accommodate the previously noted limitation since volunteers of such causes are not solely college students.

Limitations aside, it is believed that this study has provided some important first steps in better understanding relationships among moral judgment development, authenticity, nonprejudice, and volunteerism. Although some important issues have been identified that should be addressed in future study, the current study has been able to address some unresolved concerns left behind by prior considerations of similar constructs. Most important, however, this study affirms that moral actions such as volunteerism are the result of a variety of factors that can have either independent or joint contributions. Consequently, moral researchers and educators must continue to pursue relevant contributors if their goals are to better understand moral development as a whole and best practice for moral education.

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